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NOTE
LETTERS OF CREDIT: DOUBTS AS TO THEIR CONTINUED
USEFULNESS
I. INTRODUCTION
The letter of credit can be an extremely useful device for facilitat-
ing complex international and domestic business transactions.' Al-
though issued in a great variety of forms,2 the modern letter of credit
may basically be defined as a written instrument, issued by a bank or
other financial institution,' in which the issuer promises to honor
drafts presented by the specified beneficiary in compliance with the
terms of the credit.4 The customer requesting the bank to issue the
letter of credit in turn promises to reimburse the issuer and pay it a
1. Letters of credit have played a major role in the financing of trade goods, at least
since the twelfth century, and perhaps as far back as the time of the Phoenicians,
Babylonians, Assyrians, and Greeks. Wiley, How to Use Letters of Credit in Financing
the Sale of Goods, 20 Bus. LAW. 495 (1965). In recent years, as much as ninety percent of
the United States' merchandise imports have been financed by letters of credit. W.
HAWKLAND, 2 A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 791 (1964).
2. The forms that a letter of credit can take are as varied as the transactions to which
they are adapted. In addition to basic sales contracts, letters of credit are used as ad-
juncts to construction contracts, corporate consolidations and the issuance of commercial
paper. They are also used instead of, or in connection with, bid and performance bonds,
escrow accounts, stock transfers and purchases, and leases of real and personal property.
Even the common charge card has been said to be no more than a plastic letter of credit.
Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 251, 252
(1972).
3. "Although letters of credit are commonly thought of as being issued by banks and
private bankers, other financing institutions can and do enter into transactions which fit
the traditional concept of letters of credit." Uniform Commercial Code thereinafter
U.C.C.] § 5-102, Comment 1 (1976).
4. See generally H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 180-84 (5th ed. 1974).
The Uniform Commercial Code, defines "credit" or "letter of credit" as an "engagement
by a bank or other person made at the request of a customer and of a kind within the
scope of this Article (Section 5-102) that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands
for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit. U.C.C. §
5-103(a).
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commission for issuing the credit.5
This note will discuss the future of the letter of credit in the com-
mercial setting. Doubts as to their continued usefulness stem from the
increasing willingness of courts to look beyond the letter of credit con-
tract to the underlying transaction.$ First, this note examines the oper-
ation of the letter of credit in general terms,' then proceeds to explain
the difference between the commercial (traditional) letter of credit and
the standby letter of credit.8 Further, this note looks at how the Uni-
form Commercial Code deals with letters of credit and how the "fraud"
exception to honoring a letter of credit has become more of a "rule"
than an exception. 9 Finally, the note attempts to make recommenda-
tions for the future,1" to assure that the letter of credit maintains its
continued usefulness in complex commercial transactions.
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF LETTERS OF CREDIT
The basic letter of credit arrangement involves three parties: the
issuer, the customer, and the beneficiary." These parties are engaged
in three contractual relationships." The first contract is the "underly-
ing transaction," between the customer, the person applying for the
letter of credit" and the beneficiary, the party to whom the letter is
issued." Usually, this contract involves a promise by the customer to
pay a certain sum to the beneficiary 5 incident to either a sales transac-
tion or a service contract."s The second is the contract between the
issuer 1 and its customer whereby the issuer agrees to issue the letter of
5. For a thorough discussion of the letter of credit and its mechanics see infra notes
11-35 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 57-70, 112-57 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 11-24 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 84-111 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 158-67 and accompanying text.
11. See U.C.C. § 5-103 (1)(a).
12. See, e.g., Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir.
1970); Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995
(N.D. Ga. 1973).
13. A customer is defined as "a buyer or other person who causes an issuer to issue a
credit. The term also includes a bank which procures issuance or confirmation on behalf
of that bank's customer." U.C.C. § 5-103 (1)(g).
14. A beneficiary is defined as a "person who is entitled under [the letter of credit] to
draw or demand payment." U.C.C. § 5-103 (1)(d).
15. See H. HARFIELD, LETTERS OF CRzDrr 1-2 (1979).
16. See J. WHITr & R. SUMMERS, HANDsOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 18-1, at 708-09 (2d ed. 1980).
17. The "issuer" is defined as "a bank or other person issuing a credit." U.C.C. § 5-
103 (1)(c). The issuer's obligations to the customer are detailed in Section 5-109, and the
obligations owed to the beneficiary in Section 5-114.
[Vol. 8
LETTERS OF CREDIT
credit to the beneficiary and the customer agrees to reimburse the is-
suer for the amount paid out under the credit, plus a commission.' 8 In
submitting the draft,1' the beneficiary must comply with the terms and
conditions supplied by the customer in its contract with the issuer.2 0 If
the documents tendered by the seller (the beneficiary) comply, the is-
suer "must" pay;2 no interference from the customer is allowed.22 The
letter of credit is thus an "engagement"" by the issuer to the benefi-
ciary, on account of the customer, to support the customer's agreement
to pay money under the customer-beneficiary contract."'
In general, letters of credit are used in one of two ways: either as a
mechanism of payment,2 5 or as a guaranty." When used as a payment
mechanism they are known as commercial (traditional) letters of
credit." When used as guarantees they are called standby letters of
credit."
The commercial letter of credit is used exclusively in the sale of
18. The Code expressly provides for reimbursement unless otherwise agreed. U.C.C. §
5-114(3).
19. As defined in U.C.C. § 5-103 (1)(b), "[a] 'documentary draft' or a 'documentary
demand for payment' is one in which honor is conditioned upon the presentation of a
document or documents. 'Document' means any paper including document of title, se-
curity, invoice, certificate, notice of default and the like." Id. The term documentary
draft was intended by the drafters to be construed in an extremely broad fashion. See id.
§ 5-103, Comment 2.
20. See Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l., 608 F.2d 43, 46-48
& n.1 (2d Cir. 1979); Ins. Co. of N.A. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173-174 (3rd
Cir. 1979); Courtaulds N.A., Inc. v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 805-06 (4th
Cir. 1975); Int'l Leather Distribs. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 464 F. Supp. 1197,
1201 & n.9 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979).
21. U.C.C. § 5-114(1); e.g., Pringle-Associated Mtge. Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank,
571 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1978); Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l
Bank, 550 F.2d 1077, app. A at 1081 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (adopting memoran-
dum decision of lower court).
22. U.C.C. § 5-114, Comment 1. "The duty of the issuer to honor where there is fac-
tual compliance with the terms of the credit is ... independent of any instructions from
its customer once the credit has been issued and received by the beneficiary." Id. This
rule may not be varied by contractual agreement. Id. § 5-114(1), Comment 1.
23. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a); see Baker v. Nat'l Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024
(N.D. Ill. 1975).
24. See Pringle-Associated Mtge. Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d at 874 (5th
Cir. 1978); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d at 464-65 (2d Cir. 1970);
West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Skroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107-12 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
25. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
27. Arnold & Bransilver, The Standby Letter of Credit-The Controversy Contin-
ues, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 272, 277 (1978).
28. Id. at 278.
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goods.2 9 In the typical commercial credit situation, a buyer (the cus-
tomer) who has entered into a contract for the purchase of goods
makes arrangements with his bank (the issuer) for the issuance of a
letter of credit in favor of his seller (the beneficiary). 30 By such a
credit, the seller receives payment for the goods upon presentment to
the bank of drafts and specified documents.3 '
The standby letter of credit, on the other hand, differs from the
commercial letter of credit in that the issuer will pay the beneficiary a
certain amount upon presentation of documentation stating that its
customer has defaulted on the underlying contract.3 " For example, a
developer (the customer) contracts with a construction company (the
beneficiary) who demands assurance that it will be paid in full upon
completion of the building and insists that the developer obtain from a
bank (the issuer), a standby letter of credit that will make payment
available in the event the developer should default.3 3
The most significant difference between commercial and standby
letters of credit is in the nature of the obligation of the issuer. The
commercial letter of credit requires the issuer to pay the beneficiary in
the ordinary course of performance, while the standby letter of credit
requires the issuer to pay the beneficiary only when there has been
default by the customer.3 ' Hence, the name "standby" indicates that
the letter of credit is only an instrument of assurance."
29. Id. at 277.
30. A simple hypothetical will help to clarify the traditional letter of credit transac-
tion. Suppose that a New York businessman wishes to purchase custom-built desks from
a London merchant. The merchant agrees to build thirty desks for $75,000. The manu-
facture of the desks will take eight months. The seller refuses to sell on credit because he
is unable to obtain a reliable credit history on the buyer. The seller is concerned that the
buyer will breach the agreement and leave him with thirty custom desks for which there
is no ready market. Conversely, the buyer refuses to pay in advance because he is reluc-
tant to forgo eight months use of the purchase price, and he also is concerned with the
solvency of the seller's small business. This is where the commercial letter of credit
comes into play. The New York businessman will have his bank issue a letter of credit in
favor of the London merchant. The merchant will receive payment for the desks upon
presentment to the New York bank of specified documents.
31. B. KOZOLCHYK, COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT IN THE AMERICAS 9, 33 & n.54
(1966).
32. See Comment, Letters of Credit: Current Theories and Usages, 39 LA. L. REV.
581, 581-85, 609-13 (1979).
33. Note, Letters of Credit: Injunction As A Remedy For Fraud In U.C.C. Section 5-
114, 63 MINN. L. REV. 487, 494 (1979).
34. See Del Duca, Pitfalls of "Boiler-Plating" Letters of Credit, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 3
(1980).
35. It is not uncommon for buyer and seller to demand that a letter of credit be
issued in standby transactions. This insures the performance of both parties.
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III. COMMERCIAL PRINCIPLES-THE RULE OF INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTS
The commercial principles governing the documentary letter of
credit are based on the premise that "banks deal in documents, not in
merchandise. 37 From this, the courts have fashioned what has been
termed the independent contracts rule," which states that an issuer's
obligation under its letter of credit is a commitment to pay solely in
accordance with the terms of credit, independent of any underlying
contract between the parties."9 The issuer is under a legal duty to
honor demands for payment that comply with the terms of the credit
agreement, without reference to the beneficiary's performance of the
underlying contract.4 0 As codified in the Uniform Commercial Code,
the issuer's obligation to its customer is to "examine documents with
care so as to ascertain that on their face they appear to comply with
the terms of the credit."4 If the documents comply, then the payment
must be honored "regardless of whether the goods or documents con-
form to the underlying contract. '42
The letter of credit offers a degree of certainty for which parties to
a complex transaction can bargain - certainty without which the par-
ties may not be able to transact business at all.4 The letter of credit is,
36. The documents required are set out by the letter of credit and may vary. The
Code defines "document as "any paper including document of title, security, invoice,
certificate, notice of default and the like." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(b). Other documents that
might be required include commercial invoices, bills of lading, insurance policies, weigh-
ing certificates, certificates of quality, and customs clearance receipts. Comment, Com-
mercial Letters of Credit: Development and Expanded Use in Modern Commercial
Transactions, 4 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 134, 143 (1973).
A "documentary" letter of credit requires the beneficiary to tender special papers
before receiving payment. It provides maximum protection to the customer because the
beneficiary must present all documents listed before he can draw against the letter. A
"clean" letter of credit is used less frequently and requires only the drawing of a draft
without any documents. See Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25
STAN. L. REV. 716, 718-19 (1973).
37. H. HARFIELD, supra note 4, at 71. See, e.g., Itek Corp. v. First Nat. Bank of Bos-
ton, 730 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1984); Rockwell Intern. Systems Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719
F.2d 583, 589 (2d Cir. 1983); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 462
(2d Cir. 1970).
38. See, e.g., Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 730 F.2d at 24; Venizelos, 425
F.2d at 464-65; Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 722, 31 N.Y.S.
2d 631, 633-34 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343,
357, 336 A.2d 316, 323 (1975).
39. See cases cited in note 38 supra. See also H. HARFIELD, supra note 4, at 31-32.
40. See HARFIELD, supra note 4 at 180-84.
41. U.C.C. § 5-109(2).
42. Id. at § 5-114(1).
43. See generally KOZOLCHYK, supra note 31, at 11-12.
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in effect, an allocation of risk between the customer and the benefi-
ciary." By requiring use of a letter of credit, the beneficiary may
greatly reduce his risk of not being paid, however, certainty of payment
for the beneficiary is risk of loss for the customer." Since the rule of
independent contracts requires the issuer to honor the drafts of the
beneficiary despite defective performance of the underlying contract,
the customer will be without a remedy if, for some reason, he is unable
to make himself whole by suit on the contract. 4
The rule of independent contracts produces desirable commercial
results in most cases, as the customer is willing to expose himself to a
risk of loss for the eventual commerical gain he may effect in a success-
ful transaction. The rule produces questionable results, however, in the
recurring situation where the underlying transaction is tainted by the
beneficiary's fraud. In cases of beneficiary fraud in which an action
by the customer on the underlying contract would be ineffectual," the
rule of independent contracts would operate to unjustly enrich an un-
scrupulous beneficiary.
Faced with the harsh results that the rule of independent con-
tracts could produce in these kinds of cases, some courts have con-
cluded that the rule should not protect a fraudulent beneficiary."' Ju-
44. See Harfield, supra note 2, at 257-58.
45. The degree of risk to the customer, like the degree of certainty to the beneficiary,
is a matter of bargaining between the parties. If the letter of credit requires the benefi-
ciary to present extensive documentation evidencing the performance of his obligations
when presenting drafts for payment, the customer exposes himself to relatively little risk
in entering the letter of credit agreement. The less evidence required, the greater risk
undertaken. Justice, Letters of Credit; Expectations and Frustrations (pt. 1), 94 BANK-
ING L.J. 424, 429-30 (1977).
46. In most international transactions, an action on the contract is a difficult under-
taking because it must usually be litigated in the beneficiary's country. Engaging in liti-
gation in other countries may be prohibitively expensive. See Dynamics Corp. of America
v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
47. See, e.g., Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. at 720-23, 31
N.Y.S. 2d at 632-35 (1941).
48. A customer's legal remedy for breach of the underlying contract may be ineffec-
tual for several reasons, but the most common is the impending insolvency of either the
customer or the beneficiary. The nearly insolvent customer may be faced with bank-
ruptcy if he has to reimburse the issuer without receiving the anticipated benefits of the
underlying contract. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank,
356 F. Supp. 991, 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1973); NMC Enters., Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1427, 1429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). Of course, an action on the
underlying contract may be fruitless if the beneficiary is insolvent at the time of pay-
ment or becomes insolvent after disposing of the proceeds of the credit. See, e.g., Shaffer
v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments, 250 N.W. 2d 172, 181-182 (Minn. 1977).
49. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers' Title & Trust Co., 297 F. 152, 158 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 585 (1924); Banco Tornquist, S.A. v. Am. Bank & Trust Co.,
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dicial efforts, however, to balance the commercial utility of letters of
credit against the desire to prevent the unjust enrichment of a de-
frauding beneficiary have been unsatisfactory as well as inconsistent.
Case law prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code was
unclear. 50 Section 5-114 of the Code,51 in attempting to resolve the in-
consistencies in the common law, appears merely to have codified
them.52
IV. THE "FRAUD IN THE TRANSACTION" EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTS
(a) The Sztejn Case
In the context of an ordinary breach of the underlying contract by
the beneficiary, the rule of independent contracts is supportable on the
ground that the customer has accepted the risk that payment may be
made despite some defects in the beneficiary's performance.5 3 If the
rule were not observed and payment were not made, the parties' expec-
tations and allocations of risk would be upset. Beneficiaries would soon
cease to view letters of credit as means of rapid, guaranteed payment,
and their commercial utility would be lost."'
As the degree of the beneficiary's breach increases to the point of
"fraud," however, the rule of independent contracts produces inequita-
ble results. Thus, a number of pre-Code cases recognized that there
should be an exception to the independent contract rule in the case of
beneficiary "fraud."5 These courts held that an issuer could be en-
joined from honoring a credit, even though the beneficiary had
presented documents that technically conformed to its terms, when al-
lowing honor would defraud the customer. 6
The leading pre-Code case on the issue of whether an injunction 57
71 Misc. 2d 874, 875, 337 N.Y.S.2d 489, 490 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Kingdom of Sweden v. N.Y.
Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441-42, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 790 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Asbury Park &
Ocean Grove Bank v. Nat'l City Bank, 35 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988-89 (Sup. Ct. 1942); aff'd
mem., 268 A.D. 984, 52 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1944); Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 722, 31 N.Y.S. 2d at
634-35; Higgins v. Steinhardter, 106 Misc. 168, 169, 175 N.Y.S. 279, 280 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
50. See infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
51. U.C.C. § 5-114.
52. See infra notes 90-99, 116-157 and accompanying text.
53. See Harfield, supra note 2, at 257-58.
54. See, e.g., Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 721, N.Y.S. 2d at 633; Intraworld, 461 Pa., 357-59,
336 A.2d at 323 (1975).
55. See supra note 49 and cases cited therein.
56. Id.
57. Injunctive relief is usually sought in letter of credit cases. See Harfield, supra
note 2, at 260.
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against a letter of credit was permissible was Sztejn v. J. Henry Schro-
der Banking Corp.58 In Sztejn, the plaintiff had contracted with Tran-
sea Trader, Ltd., of Lucknow, India, to purchase a quantity of bristles.
In order to pay for the bristles, Sztejn caused his bank to issue an
irrevocable59 commercial letter of credit to Transea providing for pay-
ment upon presentation of a draft, invoice and bill of lading made out
to the bank's order.6 0
After shipping fifty crates of material, Transea presented the ap-
propriate documents to the bank." Before the bank paid the draft,
however, Sztejn filed suit in New York State Supreme Court to declare
the letter of credit and draft void, and to enjoin payment of the draft.62
Sztejn alleged that Transea had filled the fifty crates with "cowhair,
other worthless material and rubbish."63 Transea moved the court to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
The question presented to the court was whether Sztejn had the
right to intervene between the payor bank and the beneficiary (Tran-
sea). Moreover, the court was concerned as to whether or not there
should be a "mechanical application of the doctrine, that, in letter of
credit transactions, the criterion is form not ultimate truth."'  The
New York State Supreme Court found the independence of the letter
of credit from the underlying contract of sale to be "well-established",
articulating it as follows:
[A] letter of credit is independent of the primary contract of
sale between the buyer and the seller. The issuing bank agrees
58. 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S. 2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Although this case was not de-
cided by New York's highest court, it is followed by courts throughout this country as
well as abroad. See, e.g., Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 359-
60, 336 A.2d 316, 325 (1975); Edward Owen Eng'r Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, [1977] 3 W.L.R.
764, 771. The latter case was decided by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales. See
also KOZOLCHYK, Legal Aspects of Letters of Credit and Related Secured Transactions,
11 LAW. AM. 265, 281 (1979).
59. An "irrevocable" letter of credit is one in which the issuing bank's obligation can-
not be cancelled or altered unilaterally. The "revocable" credit is one in which the bank's
obligation to pay may be modified or cancelled at any time, without notice to the benefi-
ciary. Obviously, the beneficiary's certainty of enforcing the bank's promise in the case of
a "revocable" credit is virtually nonexistent until the moment of actual payment by the
bank. See H. HARTFIELD, supra note 4, at 40-42; KOZOLCHvK, supra note 31, at 19-21.
Because of its limited appeal to risk-averse beneficiaries, the "revocable" letter of credit
is very rarely, if ever, used in modern commercial transactions. See H. HARFIELD, supra
note 4, at 41.
60. Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 720, 31 N.Y.S. 2d at 633.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See H. HARFIELD, supra note 15, at 82.
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to pay upon presentation of documents, not goods. The rule is
necessary to preserve the efficiency of the letter of credit as an
instrument for the financing of trade.8 6
However, the court decided that the independence principle should
yield if performance on the underlying contract is so inadequate that it
cannot be characterized as a "mere breach of warranty regarding the
quality of the merchandise." 6 Under these circumstances, the court
must assume:
that the seller has intentionally failed to ship any goods or-
dered by the buyer. In such a situation, where the seller's fraud
has been called to the bank's attention before the drafts and
documents have been presented for payment, the principle of
the independence of the bank's obligation under the letter of
credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous
seller.17
Enjoining payment of the draft in such situations would protect the
interests of the issuing bank as well as those of its customer. "Although
the bank is not interested in the exact detailed performance of the
sales contract, it is vitally interested in assuring itself that there are
some goods represented by the documents." ' Under the circumstances
the court held that the customer (Sztejn) was entitled to enjoin the
bank from making payment under these circumstances because this
controversy involved not mere breach of warranty but an allegation of
intentional failure to ship the goods."
The Sztejn case thus appeared to carve out an exception to the
rule of independent contracts, for cases in which the underlying trans-
action was tainted by beneficiary "fraud". As later cases showed, how-
ever, the holding of Sztejn was less than clear.7 0
(b) The Uniform Commercial Code
The fraud in the transaction exception created in Sztejn has been
codified in Section 5-114 of the Uniform Commercial Code.7 1 This sec-
65. Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 720, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
66. Id. at 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
69. Id. at 722-23, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634-65 (emphasis added).
70. See infra notes 84-157 and accompanying text.
71. See United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 259,
360 N.E.2d 943, 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (1976); but cf. H. HARFIELD, supra note 4, at
605.
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tion reads, in pertinent part:
(1) An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment
which complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless
of whether the goods or documents conform to the underlying
contract for sale or other contract between the customer and
the beneficiary.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, when documents appear on their
face to comply with the terms of credit but a required docu-
ment . . . is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the
transaction: (a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for
payment if honor is demanded by . .. a holder in due
course. . . ; and (b) in all other cases as against its customer,
an issuer acting in good faith may honor the draft or demand
for payment despite notification from the customer of fraud,
forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the docu-
ments but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such
honor."'
Subsection (1) of Section 5-114 embodies the traditional rule of
independent contracts which is central to the letter of credit concept
and was reaffirmed by Sztejn. A letter of credit is issued and honored
without regard to the quality of the beneficiary's performance of the
underlying contract.7
Subsection (2) delineates the issuer's obligations upon the present-
ment of documents which appear on their face to conform to the terms
of the credit but are forged or fradulent, or if there is "fraud in the
transaction."'7' Under subsection (2)(a), if the presenter of the draft is
the equivalent of a holder in due course, the general rule of indepen-
dent contracts applies. Like Sztejn,7 5 the issuer is obligated to honor
the presentment, even if forged or fraudulent. 76 Under subsection
(2)(b), if the presenter is anything but a holder in due course, the bank
is not obligated to honor. 7 It may honor despite notification from the
customer of fraud, forgery, or other defect not apparent on the face of
72. U.C.C. § 5-114 (emphasis added).
73. Id. § 5-114(1). See also U.C.C. § 5-109(1) which provides as follows: "An issuer's
obligation to its customer ... does not include liability or responsibility (a) for perform-
ance of the underlying contract for sale or other transaction between the customer and
the beneficiary .... "
74. U.C.C. § 5-114(2).
75. Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
76. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a). Section 3-302(1) defines a holder in due course a one who
takes an instrument for value, in good faith and without notice of any fault of the instru-
ment. Id. § 3-302(1).
77. See Note, supra note 33, at 494.
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the documents; the Official Comment makes it clear that the issuer in
subsection (2)(b) situations may also choose not to honor, either of its
own volition or when requested to do so by the customer." If the sub-
section (2)(b) conditions exist, and the issuer refuses to dishonor the
drafts as requested by the customer, the customer may seek recourse in
a court. Section 5-114 may be said, therefore, to allow two sorts of dis-
honor under the letter of credit: elective dishonor where an issuer
chooses to comply with a customer's request, and injunctive dishonor
ordered by a court. 79
For decades, legal analysts have tried to reconcile first Sztejn and,
later Section 5-114(2) with the independence principle.80 There would
be no conflict if Sztejn and the Code permitted an injunction only for
forged or fraudulent documents,"' for every letter of credit implicitly
requires the documents presented to be genuine. 82 But the phrase
"fraud in the transaction" is obviously not so limited, and its meaning
is not clarified anywhere in Article 5 or its Official Comments. This
omission by the drafters of the Code has resulted in uncertainty as to
the proper standard of fraud, and also as to the bounds of the "trans-
action" that can properly be examined in determining the existence of
the fraud.8 3
i. Fraud
Under Section 5-114, fraud is the only exception to the concept of
independent contracts and is the sole basis for an injunction against
honoring a letter of credit.84 In examining the issue of fraud, the first
question one must ask is how fraud should be defined. As has already
been mentioned, neither the Code nor its Official Comments define
78. U.C.C. § 5-114, Comment 2.
79. See Note, supra 33, at 494.
80. See generally H. HARFIELD, supra note 4; Note, supra note 33, at 501-08.
81. What distinguishes a "fraudulent document" from a "forged document" or "fraud
in the transaction" is unclear. As an example of a "forged document" the drafters proba-
bly had in mind a bill of lading created out of whole cloth by the beneficiary instead of
by a carrier. A bill of lading properly issued by a carrier but altered by the beneficiary
would have been a "fraudulent document." See Mentschikoff, Letters of Credit: The
Need for Uniform Legislation, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 613 (1956). Some pre-Code deci-
sions seem to have used the term "fraudulent documents" when actually concerned with
performance of the underlying contract represented in the documents. See, e.g., Shaffer
v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments, 311 Minn. 452, 250 N.W.2d 172 (1977); O'Grady v.
First Union Nat'l Bank, 296 N.C. 212, 250 S.E.2d 587 (1978).
82. See Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 721, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
83. See Note, supra note 33, at 497.
84. U.C.C. § 5-114(2).
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fraud. As a result, courts, when considering the term "fraud '8 in the
context of beneficiary malfeasance, are divided as to its degree. Little
guidance on this question can be had from Sztejn. Due to its proce-
dural posture, the case was decided on the most extreme facts. The
defendant bank had moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action. The court, therefore, had to assume that the allega-
tions of the plaintiff customer were true; that the beneficiary had in-
tentionally engaged in a scheme to completely defraud the customer.8 "
Several courts have viewed the Code's failure to define fraud as
implicitly permitting them broad discretion in applying equitable prin-
ciples to the letter of credit cases.8 7 These courts have been moving
away from the strict standard of "egregious" 8 8 fraud by the seller (such
as Sztejn, where the goods are totally nonconforming or nonexistent)
to a more flexible "constructive" fraud standard.89
This constructive fraud concept was applied in Dynamics Corp. of
America v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank.9 In that case, a standby
letter of credit 1 was issued by Dynamics' bank in favor of India, in
order to insure the delivery by Dynamics of certain defense related
communications equipment to India.2 The standby could be drawn
upon by the presentation of a document signed by the Indian Presi-
dent stating that Dynamics had defaulted on its obligations under the
contract.8 When war broke out between India and Pakistan, the
85. For a discussion of § 5-114 fraud, see Symons, Letter of Credit: Fraud, Good
Faith and the Basis for Injunctive Relief, 54 TUL. L. REV. 338 (1980).
86. Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 721, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
87. See United Bank, 41 N.Y.2d at 261, 360 N.E.2d at 949, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (the
court employed a broad standard in holding that a shipment of old, ripped, unpadded
and mildewed gloves rather than new boxing gloves constitutes fraud in the transaction).
See also Dynamics, 356 F. Supp. at 998 (intentional misrepresentation not necessary
element of fraud).
88. Examples of some definitions of egregious fraud are: "outrageous conduct which
shocks the conscience of the court," Symons, supra note 85, at 348; "flagrant violation of
the beneficiary's obligation under the letter of credit," Harfield, Enjoining Letter of
Credit Transactions, 95 BANKING L.J. 596, 602 (1978); and "situations of fraud in which
the wrongdoing of the beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legiti-
mate purposes of the independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer be served,"
Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 359, 336 A.2d 316, 324-25, 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 191, 203 (1975) (for a discussion of Intraworld see infra notes 163-167
and accompanying text).
89. See, e.g., Dynamics, 356 F. Supp. at 998; United Bank, 41 N.Y.2d at 254, 392
N.Y.S.2d at 265; NMC Enters., Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 14 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
90. 356 F. Supp 991 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
91. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
92. Dynamics, 356 F. Supp. at 993.
93. Id. at 994.
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United States placed an embargo on shipments to India, making fur-
ther performance by Dynamics impossible. 4 As a result of the United
States embargo, India claimed that there was no delivery (resulting in
a breach by Dynamics) and presented the issuer with the documents
required under the standby letter.9 5 Dynamics, then bankrupt, claimed
that India's demand for payment was fraudulent because the contract
provided for delivery at Dynamics' plant, where the goods had been
tendered.9 6 In discussing the Section 5-114(2) standard of fraud, the
court stated:
[T]he law of fraud is not static and the courts have, over the
years, adapted it to the changing nature of commercial transac-
tions in our society . . .. [I]n a suit for equitable relief - such
as this one - it is not necessary that the plaintiff establish all
the elements of actionable fraud. Fraud has a broader meaning
in equity [than at law] .. .and intention to defraud or mis-
represent is not a necessary element.
9 7
Applying this constructive fraud standard, the court viewed its task as
"merely guaranteeing that India not be allowed to take unconscien-
tious advantage of the situation and run off with plaintiff's money on a
pro forma declaration which has absolutely no basis in fact,"" and it
entered the injunction.
It is questionable whether fraud existed at all in the Dynamics
case. Certainly the beneficary in Dynamics was not guilty of commit-
ting the grave and intentionally fraudulent acts which were committed
by the beneficiary in Sztejn.
Dynamics establishes a broad, equitable standard of fraud which
appears to sanction injunctive relief in cases where the beneficiary's
behavior might be more properly characterized as defective perform-
ance. Widespread adoption of this rule could lead to the use of Section
5-114 as a device for litigating breach of contract,99 quickly destroying
the utility of the letter of credit altogether.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 995.
96. Id. at 996.
97. Id. at 998 (citing S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
192-95 (1963)) (emphasis added).
98. Dynamics, 356 F. Supp. at 999.
99. Presumably, everytime there was a breach of the underlying contract, the cus-
tomer would attempt to enjoin the issuer from allowing the beneficiary to draw on the
letter of credit.
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ii. "Fraud in the Transaction"
Given the apparent difficulty in defining "fraud", it comes as no
surprise that defining "fraud in the transaction" has also been prob-
lematic. The ambiguity arises from whether the phrase "fraud in the
transaction" refers to fraud in the transaction as a whole, encompass-
ing the underlying contract (the "broad" view),100 or whether it refers
strictly to fraud in the letter of credit contract between the issuer and
beneficiary 01 (the "narrow" view). 2
Again, the Sztejn case is not particularly helpful, since language in
the opinion is susceptible to both the broad and narrow reading of
"transaction". In one part of the Sztejn opinion, the court recognized
that the doctrine of independent contracts "presupposes that the docu-
ments accompanying the draft are genuine and conform in terms to the
requirements of the letter of credit."'0 Using this language as author-
ity some courts have held that Sztejn stands only for the proposition
that a document which falsifies the facts it purports to represent, in
order to cover up a beneficiary's fraud, is a nonconforming
document.10"
Under this narrow interpretation of Sztejn, a court presented with
a request for injunctive relief will only examine the conformity of the
documents tendered under the letter of credit.105 However, if the docu-
ments refer to the performance of the underlying contract, the court
must then look beyond the letter to the beneficiary's actual perform-
ance to determine whether the documents are accurate.10 By recalling
the situation in Sztejn we can understand why this must be done; the
100. This is referred to as the "broad" exception to the rule of independent con-
tracts. American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 424
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), stay pending appeal denied, No. 79-7527 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 1979).
101. This is known as the "narrow" exception to the rule of independent contracts.
Id.
102. See Harfield, supra note 88, at 605-06.
103. Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 721, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
104. An illustration of this narrow reading is found in Merchants Corp. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 196 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968). There the beneficiary
presented documents under the letter of credit contract showing that goods were placed
on board a ship in Korea not later than January 31, 1968. In fact, the goods were not
loaded until February 13. Citing Sztejn, the court determined that the plaintiff customer
was entitled to injunctive relief because his dispute with the beneficiary was "not as to
warranty or breach of the contract between the buyer and seller but as to the terms of
the letter of credit, the independent contract between the [beneficiary] and the issuer."
Id. at 197. See, e.g., Pringle-Associated Mtge. Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d at
874; Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 550 F.2d at 1077; Harfield,
supra note 88, at 605; Verkuil, supra note 36, at 720 n. 23.
105. See Verkuil, supra note 36, at 722.
106. See KOZOLCHYK, supra note 31, at 464.
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documents presented stated that fifty crates of bristles had been deliv-
ered to Szten.10 7 The court had to scrutinize the beneficiary's perform-
ance of the underlying contract in order to determine whether or not
fifty crates of bristles had actually been shipped.
In another part of the opinion, the Sztejn court recognized that
the principle of independence "should not be extended to protect the
unscrupulous seller,"108 at least in cases of intentional and absolute
nonperformance. This language seems to support the proposition that
Sztejn was laying down a rather broad exception to the rule of inde-
pendent contracts; that a court may examine the underlying contract
and compare the beneficiary with his obligation thereunder, regardless
of the form and contents of the documents presented under the credit.
These divergent views of Sztejn have provided the framework for
differing interpretations of "fraud in the transaction" under Section 5-
114(2)(b).109
The statutory language of Section 5-1141 0 would seem to provide
a broader exception to the rule of independent contracts than the nar-
row fraud in documents exception. If "fraud in the transaction" were
limited to fraudulent documents Section 5-114 would be redundant,
since subsection 5-114(2) already describes the steps to take if the doc-
uments are "forged or fraudulent." '
Under a broad interpretation of Section 5-114, courts and issuers
have the liberty to look beyond the letter and directly to the underly-
ing transaction upon a customer's allegations of fraud. They will have
the right to scrutinize the beneficiary's performance of the underlying
transaction and compare this with his obligations thereunder in order
to determine whether his demand for payment constitutes fraud.
V. ADOPTION OF THE "BROAD" VIEW
There is a growning trend in letter of credit litigation toward
adoption of the broad view of Sztejn and Section 5-114 when dealing
with beneficiary fraud."' This tendency to adopt the "broad" view has
107. Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 721, 31 N.Y.S. 2d at 633.
108. Id. at 721-22, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
109. U.C.C. § 5-114.
110. Id.
111. Id. at § 5-114(2). See Edgewater Constr. Co. v. Percy Wilson Mortgage & Fin.
Corp., 44 Ill. App. 3d 220, 233, 357 N.E.2d 1307, 1317-18 (1976).
112. These cases include Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 730 F.2d 19 (1st
Cir. 1984); Warner v. Central Trust Co., 715 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1983); Rockell Int'l Sys.
v. Citibank, 719 F.2d 583 (2nd Cir. 1983); Paccar Int'l v. Commercial Bank of Kuwait,
587 F. Supp. 783 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Universal Marine Ins. Co. v. Beacon Ins. Co., 581 F.
Supp. 1131 (W.D.N.C. 1984).
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begun to erode the commerical utility of the letter of credit. " ' Al-
though the majority"" of court decisions have adhered to the "narrow"
view, there have been instances where courts have purported to follow
the narrow view while actually looking beyond the letter of credit to
the underlying transaction." 5
In Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments,"6 the benefi-
ciary, attempting to collect under a standby letter of credit, presented
certificates stating that the customer had failed to make payments on
authorized loans. The court, in determining whether or not to grant
injunctive relief, purported to adhere to the narrow view of Sztejn and
Section 5-114 stating: "[W]here injunctive relief is sought, the fraud
alleged must be in respect to the documents presented and not as to
the underlying transaction.""' The court, however, used the language,
"loans which are payable," thereby incorporating the underlying loan
contract into the letter of credit contract." 8 "The allegation of fraud
made by the plaintiff [customer] is appropriate for injunctive relief,"
the court said, "since it concerns the certifications by [the benefi-
ciary]." 9 Injunctive relief was granted because, according to the un-
derlying loan contract, payment was conditioned on one of two events
occurring, neither of which occurred. Therefore, the beneficiary was
guilty of fraud. 2 0
Another case where the narrow view was purportedly followed was
NMC Enters. Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.'2 In that
case, the beneficiary shipped stereo receivers with power specifications
that fell substantially below the amount warranted. 2 2 The beneficiary
presented documents showing that the drafts being drawn by him were
"due and owing." The court viewed the "due and owing" language as
incorporating the underlying sales contract into the letter of credit
contract. The court held:
If the [underlying] contract is tainted with fraud in its induce-
113. See, e.g., Harfield, supra note 88, at 605-606; Verkuil, supra note 36, at 720,
n.23. See also note 157 and accompanying text.
114. See Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.
1983); Roman Ceramics Corp. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 517 F. Supp. 526 (D. Pa. 1981.)
115. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments, 250 N.W. 2d 172, 175
(Minn. 1977); NMC Enterprises, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 14 U.C.C.
Rep. 1427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
116. 250 N.W.2d 172 (Minn. 1977).
117. Id. at 180.
118. See Note, supra note 33, at 505.
119. Shaffer, 250 N.W.2d at 180.
120. Id.
121. 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
122. Id. at 1428.
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ment, then any document or signed certificate which the letter
of credit requires [the beneficiary] to submit, as a condition to
[the issuer's] honoring the draft, that the amount covered by
the draft 'is due and owing. . . ' is equally tainted.123
These cases are examples of the fact that more courts are looking
at performance of the underlying transaction when called on to provide
injunctive relief. It is unlikely that the beneficiaries in Shaffer and
NMC Enters. contemplated that the underlying contract would be in-
corporated into the letter of credit contract when they submitted docu-
ments stating that the amount drawn under the credit was "payable"
or "due and owing." It seems clear that these courts wanted to look at
the whole transaction (i.e., the letter of credit and underlying con-
tract), and simply used this language as a means to get to the underly-
ing transaction.
i. The Iranian Letter of Credit Cases
The most voluminous letter of credit litigation in recent years, oc-
curred during the Iranian Revolution. The attack on the doctrine of
independence continued in what have been termed the Iranian Letter
of Credit Cases.2 ' These cases arose because United States companies
had billions of dollars in contracts outstanding with the Iranian gov-
ernment and its agencies.'25
A typical scenario in the Iranian cases involved the following: first,
the purchaser (the Iranian government) made an advance payment to
the U.S. company with which it had contracted.'26 In return the Ira-
nian purchasers would demand a guarantee of repayment, of the ad-
vance, as well as a performance guarantee. 27 These guarantees, made
by Iranian banks, were payable to the Iranian purchasers upon the
guarantor's receipt of the Iranian purchaser's statement that the U.S.
company had defaulted.' 28 The Iranian bank (the guarantor) required
123. Id. at 1430.
124. For a thorough discussion of the Iranian cases, see Comment, Enjoining the
International Standby Letter of Credit: The Iranian Letter of Credit Cases, 21 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 189 (1980). A number of the claims for injunctive relief were brought in antici-
pation of demands under the letter of credit. See, e.g., Stromberg Carlson Corp. v. Bank
Melli Iran, 467 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
125. Rendell, The Iranian Revolution Continues in the Courts, EUROMONEY, June
1979, at 73.
126. E.g., KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d cir.
1979); see Rendell, supra note 125, at 73.
127. United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 469 F. Supp. 473, 475-77 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Rendell, supra note 125, at 73.
128. See, e.g., KMW Int'l, 606 F. 2d at 12-13; see Rendell, supra note 125, at 73-75.
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that the U.S. company have a United States bank issue a standby let-
ter of credit with the Iranian bank as the beneficiary. " The standby
letter was payable upon a declaration by the guaranteeing Iranian
bank that it had been called upon to make payment to the Iranian
purchaser under the guarantee.' The United States issuer-bank, as in
all letter of credit situations,' would obtain an indemnification from
its customer, the U.S. company.'
After the United States broke off diplomatic and economic ties
with Iran,' the Iranian purchasers (the beneficiaries) pursued en-
forcement of the standby letters of credit, claiming default by the U.S.
companies."" The U.S. companies (the customers) sought injunctive
relief on the only available grounds, fraud. 5 Since 1979, U.S. compa-
nies have brought more than twenty separate actions to enjoin the
honoring of standbys associated with Iranian government contracts.' "
The critical issue running through these cases was the independence of
the letter of credit from the underlying contract.' Although the courts
in a majority of the cases enforced the letter of credit if its terms were
met, '8 there were instances in which the courts ignored the doctrine of
independence.8 9 These courts have enjoined the honoring of the letter
because they looked to the performance of the underlying
transaction. " 0
For example, in Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston,"' the
First Circuit held that the beneficiary's fraud had "so vitiated the en-
tire transaction that the legitimate purposes of independence of the
issuer's obligation would no longer be served"."" Itek involved a con-
tract for the manufacture and sale of high-technology equipment to
129. Id.
130. Rendell, supra note 125, at 73. The amount of the letter would correspond to
the amount of the guarantee. Id.
131. See supra notes 11-35 and accompanying text.
132. Rendell, supra note 125, at 73.
133. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
134. See, e.g., KMW Int'l, 606 F.2d at 13.
135. See, e.g., KMW Int'l, 606 F.2d 10; Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio & Televi-
sion, 691 F.2d 1344.
136. See Comment, supra note 124, at 203.
137. Id.
138. See supra note 114 and cases cited therein.
139. See, e.g., Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F. Supp. 1344
(11th Cir. 1982); Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 511 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Mass.
1981), vacated, 704 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd, 730 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1984).
140. See supra note 115.
141. 730 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1984).
142. Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
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Iran's Imperial Ministry of War, for $22.5 million. " ' Itek obtained a
performance guarantee in favor of the War Ministry from an Iranian
bank for $2.5 million, to be honored upon receipt of notice from the
War Ministry that Itek had defaulted on the contract.1 4 4 This guaran-
tee was secured by the First National Bank of Boston (Itek's bank) in
favor of the Iranian bank.14 5 By 1979, when the Iranian government
collapsed, Itek had billed the War Ministry for more than $20 mil-
lion.14 6 In April of 1979, the deterioriation of relations between the
United States and Iran caused the U.S. government to suspend Itek's
export license. 14 7 Itek later learned that the Iranian bank was demand-
ing payment from the First National Bank under the terms of credit.
1 4 8
Itek sought an injunction against honor of the credit.1 '9
In granting injunctive relief, the Itek court adopted the "broad"
view and looked at the underlying transaction.' 5" The court stated that
the War Ministry had misrepresented the quality of Itek's perform-
ance.151 It declared that it would be unfair to allow a beneficiary "to
call a letter of credit under circumstances where the underlying con-
tract plainly shows that he is not to do so.''153 The Court ultimately
held that, under the circumstances, the Iranian bank's attempted call
upon the letter amounted to fraud and permitted the injunction."'
In Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio and Television,1 4 a case
factually similar to Itek, the Eleventh Circuit also looked beyond the
letter of credit in granting injunctive relief.155 In looking at the under-
lying contract, the court held that the Iranian agency had misrepre-
sented the quality of Harris's performance.1 5 '
Although the Itek and Harris court decisions represent the minor-
ity view, they do represent dangerous precedent as they sanction look-
ing beyond the letter of credit (i.e., use of the "broad" view).
143. Id. at 20.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 20-21.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 21.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 21.
150. Id. at 24.
151. Id. at 25.
152. Id. at 24 (citing, inter alia, Dynamics, 356 F. Supp. at 991).
153. Id. at 28-40.
154. 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982).
155. The Harris court looked at the underlying contract and noted that the Iranian
government agency had misrepresented the quality of Harris's performance. Id. at 1356.
The court held that Harris would probably prevail on a "fraud in the transaction" claim
and permitted the injunction. Id. at 1356-57.
156. Id. at 1356.
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ii. Implications of the "Broad" View
Other recent letter of credit cases have also shown that courts are
willing to look beyond the independence of the letter of credit to the
underlying transaction."'
It is becoming apparent that adoption of the broad view of Sztejn
and Section 5-114 has taken a toll on the commerical utility of letters
of credit. The problem with the "broad" view is that by giving all cus-
tomers the right to seek dishonor by alleging fraud, it encourages un-
scrupulous or overanxious customers to raise frivolous claims that
would delay payment and force the beneficiary into litigation. Since
the letter of credit involves a bargain between the customer and benefi-
ciary, this unanticipated risk of delay or dishonor cannot be accounted
for in the bargaining process. Thus, the letter of credit becomes a less
attractive commercial device for prudent beneficiaries. This problem
arises because a beneficiary is prevented from ensuring payment prior
to litigation in those cases in which a customer rightfully or wrongfully
alleges fraud.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The equitable remedy of injunctive relief should remain as a rem-
edy to prevent compounding an injury when intentional fraud is pre-
sent. However, we have seen that some courts, when dealing with let-
ters of credit, have probed the underlying transaction far beyond what
the letter of credit contemplates.155 In weighing the relative perform-
ance of the underlying contract and its warranties, courts have some-
times erroneously found fraud where the intent to deceive was lack-
ing."O Furthermore, many courts have viewed "fraud in the
transaction" too broadly, using it as an invitation to investigate the
underlying transaction.6 0 Such an expansive view reduces the likeli-
hood that parties to complex transactions will use the letter of credit in
their dealings. Thus, there exists a need to find ways to limit judicial
intrusion into the letter of credit arrangement. It seems obvious that
the only way to limit judicial scrutiny is to make structural changes in
existing letter of credit law, thus eliminating the ambiguities that pres-
157. See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Systems, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583, 588-89 (2d
Cir. 1983); Roman Ceramics Corp. v. Peoples National Bank, 714 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir.
1983); United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada (H.L.(E.))
[1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039 (where court, citing Sztejn, looked to the underlying contract to
find fraud).
158. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 116-57 and accompanying text.
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ently invite intrusion.
i. Modification of Section 5-114
Much of the ambiguity that presently exists in letter of credit law
stems from the numerous potential definitions of "fraud" and "fraud
in the transaction" as used in Section 5-114.161 There is a need to:
(1) limit the scope of the term "fraud," and (2) to define exactly what
is meant by "fraud in the transaction". "Fraud" should be clearly de-
fined in the section and its accompanying Official Comments, and it
should encompass only intentional fraud. This would eliminate "con-
structive fraud" as a basis for injunction.16 2 Additionally, the ambigu-
ity of "fraud in the transaction" can be eliminated by deleting the en-
tire phrase from the section. This would compel courts to focus on the
documents themselves rather than on the underlying contract in deter-
mining whether to grant injunctive relief.
ii. Intraworld
If changes cannot be made to the Uniform Commercial Code, it
may be possible to look to judicial precedent for help. In Intraworld
Indus. Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank,1 " a Pennsylvania court clearly de-
fined a workable fraud standard which can be used when considering
an injunction. In that case, a standby letter of credit was payable to
the beneficiary upon the issuer's receipt of a statement made by the
lessor-beneficiary prescribing that the lessee-customer had not paid the
rent due on a resort hotel lease. When the issuing bank received this
statement from the beneficiary, the lessee-customer, claiming that all
the rent had been timely paid, sought to enjoin the bank from making
payment.'" In denying injunctive relief, the court stated:
In light of the basic rule of the independence of the issuer's
engagement and the importance of this rule to the effectuation
of the purposes of the letter of credit, we think that the cir-
cumstances which will justify an injunction against honor must
be narrowly limited to situations of fraud in which the wrong-
doing of the beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction
that the legitimate purposes of the independence of issuer's
obligation would no longer be served. A court of equity has the
limited duty of guaranteeing that the beneficiary not be al-
161. U.C.C. § 5-114.
162. See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
163. 461 Pa. 343, 336 A.2d 316 (1975).
164. Id. at 345-48, 336 A.2d at 318-21.
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lowed to take unconscientious advantage of the situation and
run off with the plaintiffis [customer's] money. . . [upon docu-
mentation supplied to the issuer] which has absolutely no basis
in fact. "5
The Intraworld court realized that the independence of the is-
suer's obligation from the underlying transaction allows for commercial
certainty and gives the letter of credit its utility. 6' The court set forth
the well reasoned policy that it should only interfere in a letter of
credit transaction (i.e. grant injunctive relief) when the beneficiary has
acted in such a reprehensible manner in the underlying transaction
that allowing him to receive payment under the letter would be
unconscionable.10
7
-This standard is helpful because it de-emphasizes abstract con-
cepts of "fraud" and "transaction" that offer little guidance to courts
confronted with close cases. Instead, it focuses attention on the pur-
pose of the "independence of the issuer's obligation," which is to pro-
vide an assured mode of payment and thereby preserve the commercial
utility of the letter of credit.
VII. CONCLUSION
The usefulness of the letter of credit in facilitating complex inter-
national and domestic transactions stems from the independence of the
issuer's obligation to the beneficiary from the underlying transaction.
The situations in which a court may prohibit the issuer from making
payment under the letter should be clearly defined. Ambiguities must
be removed from the law if the letter of credit is to retain viability.
Nadeem Faruqi
165. Id. at 359, 336 A.2d at 324-25 (emphasis added) (quoting Dynamics, 356 F.
Supp. at 999).
166. Id. at 357, 336 A.2d at 323.
167. Id. at 359, 336 A.2d at 324-25.
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